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TAKING CORPORATE SHARES BY RIGHT OF
EMINENT DOMAIN.
The last legislature of the State of Connecticut enacted a stat-
ute which by its terms enables any railroad company which shall
be the owner of more than three-fourths of the stock of any
steamboat, ferry, bridge, wharf or railroad company, to acquire
by condemnation the shares of other stockholders. The statute
is quoted in full in the margin.'
1 Public Acts, 1895. Chap. ccxxxii.
"Section i. In case any railroad company acting under the authority of
the laws of this state shall have acquired more than three-fourths of the capital
stock of any steamboat company, ferry company, bridge company, wharf com-
pany, or railroad company, and cannot agree with the holders of outstanding
stock for the purchase of the same, upon a finding by a judge of the superior
court that such purchase will be for public interest, it may cause such out-
standing stock to be appraised in the manner provided by section 3464 of the
general statutes; and when said appraisement shall have been paid or deposi-
ted as provided in said section, the stockholder or stockholders whose share or
shares shall have been so appraised shall cease to have any interest therein,
and shall on demand made, surrender said stock and all certificates thereof to
the corporation applying for such appraisal, and upon the deposit of said
appraisal said certificates shall be deemed to be cancelled.
Section 2. "Any person holding a minority of the shares of stock in any
company described in section one of this act may, if he cannot agree with the
corporation owning three-fourths of such stock for the purchase of his shares,
cause the same to be appraised in the manner provided by section one of this
act; and an appraisement having been made and recorded in the office of the
clerk of the superior court of any county where such railroad company operates
a railroad, shall operate as a judgment against such company and in .favor of
the holder of such stock, and at the end of sixty days, unless such judgment is
:paid, execution may be issued.
(Section 3464 of general statutes provides for appraisal of land needed for
railroad purposes.)
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This statute is cited as a remarkable and extreme example of
one method of effecting corporate consolidations. It is not known
to the writer whether the aid of the courts has been asked to
enforce its provisions, but it can readily be seen that in such
case there might arise important questions. The statute
suggests especially a consideration of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain upon the interests of a shareholder in a cor-
poration,-the conditions which lead to the exercise of the power,
and the propriety of its exercise by the legislature.
The corporation, a legal entity distinct from its members, is the
owner of all the corporate property and franchises. There always
exists in the State a right to take such property and franchises
for a public use, compensation for which having been paid to the
corporation, the right of each shareholder in what has been so
taken is completely extinguished, and there remains no necessity
for any proceeding against the individual shareholder. Action
against the corporation direct is always adopted unless it happens
that holders of a majority of the stock are willing to transfer the
corporate property without compelling the taker to proceed by
condemnation. Practically, therefore, condemnation of corpor-
ate shares will never be attempted except as against a dissenting
minority in cases where an extension of the corporate business
or a consolidation is contemplated by the majority. It is clear
that, if the majority had power to compel the retirement of a
minority holder upon payment to him of the value of his shares,
there would exist no occasion for a resort to taking of such shares
by eminent domain. As will be seen, the majority have asserted
such power in rare instances independently of the right of emi-
nent domain, but the authority of those cases is doubtful.
I. A shareholder cannot be compelled by the majority to join
wuith them in a fundamental alteration of the corporate business,
such as a consolidation.' This is familiar law, but it may be well
to briefly state the reasons upon which it is based.
A corporation may exercise only those powers which are
granted to it by the State. This limitation of its powers gov-
erns not only the relation of the corporation to the State, but also
the relation of the corporation to its shareholders and of the
shareholders to one another. Every holder of stock, whether
acquired by subscription or by transfer, is a party to a contract
by which he is bound to allow the common property to be man-
2 Thompson, Comm. on law of Corporations, Sec. 343; Clearwater v. Mere-
dith, Wall. 25; Morawetz, Private Corporations, 2d Ed., Secs. 395, 396;
Beach, Private Corporations, Sec. 353.
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aged, controlled and applied in the pursuit of the corporate pur-
.poses as expressed in the charter, by agents selected by the
majority. He parts with the right to individually manage, pos-
sess and control such property except through the exercise of his
voting power. But the power of the majority and of the corporate
officers over the property of the shareholders is strictly limited
to the purposes of the corporation as expressed in the charter.'
A fundamental departure from the original corporate undertak-
ing is a wrong which the shareholder may resist and prevent.
But a shareholder may not hold his fellow members to the con-
tinuance of an unprofitable business. For just cause tho majority
may abandon the enterprise, dispose of the corporate property and
distribute the net proceeds among the shareholders.
4 In such
case, however, it is the right of the shareholder to have the value
of the corporate property ascertained by an actual and bona fide
sale.5 Except as incidental to such an abandonment of the enter-
prise, a transfer of the corporate property and business to another
person or corporation may not be made without the consent of
every shareholder.
II. May the majority effect such a fundamental alteration
against the consent of a shareholder upon furnishing himn security
against loss?
In Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42
(1858), application was made by a stockholder of the defendant
company for an injunction to restrain it from consummating a
proposed merger of that company into the Philadelphia & Read-
ing R. R. Co. The merger was authorized by legislative act to
take effect on approval by a majority of the stockholders of each
corporation, the holders of stock in the defendant company to
surrender the same and receive shares of stock in the Reading
Company. No provision was made in the act or in the agree-
ment for the case of any member of the defendant company who
might not be willing to make the exchange.
The court holds that plaintiff could not be compelled to accept
shares of the Reading Company in the place of his interest in the
defendant company, but orders that the injunction asked for be
granted only until the plaintiff be given security for the value of
his stock. In Stevens v. Rutland & B. R. R. Company, 29 Vt.
Durfee v. Old Colony, etc. R. R., 5 Allen 230; Byrne v. Schuyler El.
Mfg. Co., 65 Conn. 336.
4 Price v. Holcomb, 89 Iowa 123.
Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U. S. 5o; Thompson, Comm. on Law
of Corporations, Sec. 351; Taylor v. Earle, 8 Hun. i.
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545 (i85i), after an exhaustive examination of the law and
authorities the Chancellor grants an injunction restraining the
defendant railroad from making an extension authorized by the
legislature and accepted by vote of the majority stockholders, but
not authorized by the original charter. Before the injunction
issued it was proposed to file bonds to indemnify the plaintiff, but
the Chancellor suggested that he did not deem it competent for
him to make contracts for the parties. The Chancellor cited
Natusch v. Irving, 2 Cooper Ch. 358, a case in which Lord Eldon
had granted an injunction against an unauthorized extension of
the business of a voluntary association at the suit of a dissenting
member, although it was proposed to indemnify the plaintiff.
The decision in Lauman v. R. R., that the consolidation
might be effected if plaintiff was secured from loss, has been crit-
icised,6 and the decision of the Chancellor in Stevens v. R. R.
seems to be better law. It is not consistent with the contract of
membership that the majority holders should have power to
obtain from the legislature an alteration of the corporate under-
taking and then compel a dissenting holder to accept their terms
or retire from the enterprise. In the language of Lord Eldon,
"the right of a partner is to hold to the specified purposes his
partners whilst the partnership continues, and not to rest upon
indemnities with respect to what he has not contracted to engage
in."
In the cases cited no provision had been made by the legisla-
ture for the valuation and extinction of a dissenting shareholder's
interest. Since, however, the power of the majority is deter-
mined by the contract relation of the shareholders, no legislative
act after the contract is concluded can enlarge that power. In a
New Jersey case such legislative provision was made but it was
treated by counsel and the court as an exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and is discussed infra.7
It appears, therefore, that there is no recognized right in the
majority holders to extinguish the rights and voice of a dissent-
ing minority by taking their shares at a valuation.
III. The power of the majorit , as affected by a reserved right
of amendment and repeal.
Statutory provisions, in force at the time of the stock subscrip-
tion, authorizing consolidation upon vote of the majority holders,
6 Black z. Dela. etc. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, see p. 405; Mowrey V.
Ind. R. R., 4 Bissell U. S. 78; Federal Cases, No. 9891; Thompson, Comm.
on law of Corporations, Secs. 343, 351.
7 Black v. Dela. etc. Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455.
CORPORA TE SHARES AND EMINENT DOMAIN. 209
are a part of the contract of membership. Such statutes have
sometimes provided for the appraisal of the shares of a dissenting
holder. But a difficult question arises where there is merely a
constitutional or legislative reservation of power to amend, alter
or repeal the charter of the corporation, and by a subsequent
amendment or general law the legislature authorizes an extension
of the corporate business or a consolidation.
Several cases have held that, where such power of amend-
ment is reserved, an enlargement of the corporate undertaking
by legislative authority, if it does not constitute a fundamental
alteration, will not discharge a subscriber to the stock.' Two
courts, those of Massachusetts9 and Connecticut," have gone fur-
ther and declared that a consolidation may be effected against
the consent of the minority stockholders if a general power of
amendment has been reserved. But they cannot be regarded as
concluding the question, since it might be decided contra by courts
which take the position that such power is reserved for the pro-
tection of the public interests, and concerns the contract between
the State and the corporation, not that between the sharehold-
ers." If the latter be the correct view, it follows that under such
reserved power of amendment the legislature cannot provide for
the appraisal an extinction of shares of a dissenting holder.
The contract which protects him from being unwillingly carried
into a new venture will equally protect him from being unwil-
lingly driven out of the old.
IV. The right of eminent domain.
In this situation of the law it has been suggested that the
share of a dissenting stockholder may in certain cases be extin-
guished by condemnation.
Several eminent text-writers apparently endorse this sugges-
tion. 2 Their statements are based on a single case as authority:
Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co. et al, 24 N. J. Eq. 455
(reversing Black v. Dela. etc. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 13o; 1871). In
this case a stockholder of defendant companies sought to restrain
'See Buffalo, etc. R. R. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336.
'Hale v. Cheshire R. R. Co., r6I Mass. 443; Durfee v. Old Colony, etc.
R. R., 5 Allen 230.
"OBishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289.
1See Thompson, Comm. on law of Corporations, Sees. 90, 91, 347; Old-
town R. R. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 571; Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, pp. 98, 99, note;
Mowry v. Ind. & C. R. Co., 4 Bissell U. S. 78; Fed. Cases, No. 9891.
12 Cook on Stock and Stockholders, 3d Ed., See. 896; Morawetz, Private
Corporations, 2d Ed., Sec. io89; Beach, Private Corporations, See. 355; Green's
Brice's Ultra Vires, p. 99, note.
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them from executing a lease of their property and franchises to
the Pennsylvania R. R. Company. The statute under which the
right to execute such lease was claimed provided that the contract
should be effected upon approval of two-thirds of the stockhold-
ers in each corporation, and that upon such approval any share-
holder refusing to accept the terms of the contract should be paid
the full value of his stock. The Chancellor denied the injunction,
but his decree was reversed on appeal. Although the decision
was placed expressly upon other grounds, the appellate court dis-
cusses the provisions of the statute referred to, and announces
the principle that the shares ,6f a dissenting holder may be so
taken by eminent domain. The court based its declaration solely
upon the well settled principle that corporate franchises are not
exempt from condemnation, both the Chancellor and the appel-
late court concurring in the opinion that the act in question was
constitutional.
It cannot be claimed that corporate shares are exempt from
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, for all property is
subject to the paramount necessities of the State and the public
interest. But a consideration of the nature of corporate shares as
property and of the conditions under which the right may be
claimed, proves that there is but little occasion, if any, for the
exercise of such right, while the propriety of its exercise in any
instance may be seriously questioned.
While some authorities hold that it is within the power of the
courts to decide in any instance whether the use for which the
power is claimed is such as to justify its exercise, yet the power
is political, belonging to the legislature, which must determine
the necessity, the manner and the extent of its exercise. Yet the
legislature should be controlled by a due regard for the rights of
private property, as well as for the public necessities. The right
is based upon the necessities of the public interest.
The interest of a shareholder is a proportional -right in both
the property and franchises of a corporation. To take his share
from him is to extinguish his interest in both. It should not
therefore be taken from him unless it is necessary for the public
use designated that every corporate franchise in which he has
such interest, be acquired or extinguished. The interest, also,
of the parties exercising the power demands that the stock be
left undisturbed unless they desire such acquisition or extinction
of the franchise.
A necessity can rarely, if ever, exist for acquiring or extin-
guishing the franchises of any other than a quasi-public corpora-
210
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tion, though it is possible that instances may occur where the
franchise of a private business corporation might be so dependent
upon special property for its value that to take such property
would practically destroy the franchise. Except in some such
rare instance, therefore, there could be no necessity and no desire
to exercise the power unless for the acquisition or extinction of
the active franchises of a quasi-public corporation. The property
of such a corporation is already subject to a public use.
Unless it be proposed to subject the property to a use, public
in its nature, not already within the charter powers of the corpo-
ration whose property is taken, the power of eminent domain
should not be exercised. There can be no necessity or propriety
in the taking, unless the rights of the public with reference to the
property are to be enlarged. It is within the power of the State
to enforce a full and satisfactory performance of its public duties
by a quasi-public corporation. If such corporation fails in its
duty, its charter may be forfeited, but its property and franchises
may not be transferred to another. In this connection it is per-
fectly evident that the right of eminent domain cannot be exer-
cised with propriety to enable the corporation itself, or a majority
of its stockholders, to eliminate the interest of one or more share-
holders, if the franchises of the corporation and its public duties
are to remain unchanged. The State has no concern with the
ownership of stock in a quasi-public corporation, whether it be in
one person or another, for there can be no presumption that one
shareholder will better than another perform the public service
required through the corporate agencies. (If concerned at all,
the State is interested that one quasi-public corporation should
not own stock in another).
The Connecticut statute referred to enables the dominant
holder to acquire by compulsory process any portion of the
minority stock without any alteration in the corporate powers or
duties. Although the stock so taken is directed by the statute to
be cancelled, yet the taker is apparently left with power to dispose
of the interest so acquired in such manner as it pleases. Some fur-
ther act is necessary before the stock so taken can be regarded
as taken for a public use.
This leads us to the vital objection to the exercise of the power
in question, and that is, its indirection. Since the right will
never be claimed except the majority holders desire to effect
either an enlargement of the corporate powers or a transfer of
the property and franchises, or a merger of one corporation with
another, in either case it is clear that the real taking of the
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property for the new public use occurs at the time when the
corporation acts, whether by acceptance of a new charter, by
transfer, or by agreement of merger. One process is in invitum
against the stockholders, the other, which is the real taking, is
dependent upon the voluntary action of the majority.
The right of eminent domain is properly exercised when
property is required for public use and cannot be obtained by
agreement with the owner. But the owner has no choice as to
whether he shall part with his property. The State does not con-
cern itself with his willingness or unwillingness to yield posses-
sion. Any supposed exercise of the right of eminent domain
which is grounded upon consent instead of upon necessity is
wrongful. If corporate franchises and property are required for
a new public use, the necessity is the same whether one or all the
shareholders object. In the instance cited, of Lauman v. R. R.
and Black v. Canal Company, the latter of which was expressly
announced by the court as an exercise of the right of eminent
domain, the very fact that the right of consolidation was depend-
ent upon the consent of a majority of the stockholders is itself
quite conclusive against its necessity.
Many consolidations and extensions have been effected in
which provision has been made for the appraisal of the shares of a
dissenting holder. Legislative enactments authorizing such
action customarily provide that a minority holder shall have his
election whether to receive the value of his shares or to accept
the terms upon which the majority participate in the new under-
taking. The Connecticut statute is unique in denying that
privilege.
In some instances such consolidations and extensions may
have been demanded by the public interest, but it is a matter of
common knowledge that they are usually undertaken for the
profit or advantage of majority holders and the dominant corpo-
ration. The minority holder is justly entitled to a continuance
of the original corporate undertaking according to the terms of
his contract, unless the public interest demands its termination.
That question of public use and necessity he is entitled to have
decided independently of the wishes or advantage of the majority
holders.
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